

Message Text

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ACTION EA-10

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FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9593

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMCONGEN HONG KONG

USLO PEKING

USUNMISSION NEW YORK 1534

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 2764

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH KN KS

SUBJECT: KIM IL-SUNG VISIT TO PEKING

REF: A PEKING 743, B HONG KONG 4424, C SEOUL 2689

1. DURING PEKING VISIT KIM IL-SUNG HAS TAKEN HARSH AND UNCOMPROMISING LINE ON NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND KOREAN UNIFICATION PROBLEM. WHILE IT IS DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE ON PURPOSE AND OUTCOME OF VISIT, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT KIM ENDEAVORING TO CONVINCE HIS HOSTS OF NEED TO SUPPORT HIM IN WHAT IS BASICALLY POLICY OF CONTINUED ANTAGONISM RATHER THAN DETENTE ON KOREAN PENINSULA.

2. EMBASSY HAS REPORTED IN DEPTH THE ROK CONCERN WITH IMPACT OF INDOCHINA ON KOREA. KIM'S APRIL 18 BANQUET SPEECH IN PEKING AND HIS CAREFUL ATTENTION TO SIHANOUK BEAR OUT THIS CONCERN, ILLUSTRATING KIM'S CONTENTION THAT KOREAN SITUATION IS LINKED TO
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REVOLUTIONARY EFFORTS IN OTHER AREAS, OF WHICH CAMBODIA

IS LATEST SUCCESSFUL CASE. HOWEVER, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER KIM IS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH STRENGTHENING HIS CREDENTIALS AS CHAMPION OF THIRD WORLD, FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL OPENING STAGE BY NORTH KOREAN DRIVE TO JOIN NONALIGNED NATIONS CONFERENCE, OR WITH SEEKING TO REPEAT INDOCHINA SUCCESSES IN KOREA. ON LATTER POSSIBILITY, MOFA NOTES THAT KIM IN 1966 HAD SUGGESTED UNITED ACTION IN INDOCHINA BY FORMING MILITARY GROUP OF SUPPORTERS OF NORTH VIETNAM, AND THAT HE HAD SAID AT THAT TIME THAT GROUP COULD BE PATTERN FOR ACTION IN KOREA, BUT THAT PRC HAD OBJECTED TO IDEA.

3. IT IS OF COURSE WITH POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR KOREA THAT ROKG IS CONCERNED, AND WE FIND KIM'S SPEECH NOTABLY HARD-LINE WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS HERE. APPEARING IN HIS REMARKS TO IGNORE BOTH THE ROKG AND THE UN AS RELEVANT TO THE KOREAN QUESTION, KIM STATED THAT "THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THERE BE PEACE OR WAR IN KOREA NOW DEPENDS . . . ON THE UNITED STATES." HE CALLED FOR THE REMOVAL OF US TROOPS AND REPLACEMENT OF EXISTING GOVERNMENT IN ROK, IN RETURN FOR WHICH NORTH KOREA WOULD OFFER UNILATERAL GUARANTEE OF PEACE. ALTHOUGH HE GAVE NO TIME LIMIT IN INSISTING ON US WITHDRAWAL, KIM CLEARLY INDICATED THAT HIS SCENARIO FOR SOLVING KOREAN QUESTION INVOLVES A REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH LEADING TO UNIFICATION OF THE PENINSULA, IF THE US DOES NOT INTERFERE "IN WHAT THE PEOPLE ARE DOING."

4. MOFA FINDS THE KIM SPEECH THREATENING, HARsher IN TONE AND CLEARER IN MEANING THAN PREVIOUS NORTH KOREAN PRONOUNCEMENTS. WHILE MAINTAINING LINE THAT US IS KEY TO SETTLEMENT OF KOREAN PROBLEM, KIM WENT FURTHER THAN BEFORE IN STATING HIS MILITANT INTENTIONS, ACCORDING TO MOFA, WITH HIS DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION AND HIS STATEMENT THAT "IN THIS WAR WE WILL ONLY LOSE THE MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND WILL GAIN THE COUNGRY'S REUINFICATION". ON THE OTHER HAND, TENG SPEECH IN MOFA'S VIEW DID NOT BREAK NEW GROUND, AS CHINESE APPARENTLY REFRAINED FROM DIRECT SUPPORT

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FOR KOREAN REVOLUTION.

5. MOFA ALSO SEES VISIT IN CONTEXT OF INDOCHINA AND SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY ALTHOUGH IS UNSURE OF WHETHER IT WAS INITIATED BY CHINESE OR NORTH KOREANS. A SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO MOSCOW BY KIM IS SEEN AS A POSSIBILITY BY ROKG, SINCE IN 1961, ON HIS LAST TRIP TO THE TWO CAPITALS, KIM VISITED MOSCOW FIRST

AND THEN PEKING A WEEK LATER. MOFA BELIEVES THAT KIM WOULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO CHINA AT THIS TIME AND DOUBTS A RECENT PRESS STORY THAT USSR HAS ASKED NORTH KOREA TO PAY ITS KOREAN WAR DEBTS. EMBASSY NOTES THAT RECENT PYONGYANG RADIO REPORTS OF RETURNING DPRK DELEGATIONS HAVE EMPHASIZED PRESENCE AT AIRPORT OF SOVIET DIPLOMATS, AS IN CASE OF IPU DELEGATION RETURNING FROM COLOMBO VIA PEKING, WHEN SOVIET GREETER WAS ONLY DIPLOMAT IDENTIFIED BY COUNTRY.

6. ROK PRESS CONTINUES TO EXPRESS VIEW THAT KIM'S VISIT IS DESIGNED TO GAIN PRC SUPPORT FOR MILITARY MOVE AGAINST ROK. HIS BANQUET REMARKS WERE CRITICIZED BY MOST PAPERS AS PROVOCATIVE, WITH TONGA ILBO CALLING HIS SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN SOUTH AN OPEN VIOLATION OF THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUE. TONGA LAMENTED FACT THAT KIM INTENDS USING ANTI-COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN ROK FOR HIS COMMUNIST POLITICAL PURPOSES. GOING ONE PREDICTABLE STEP FURTHER, SEMI-OFFICIAL KYUNGHYANG SHINMUN SAID "IT IS NOT THE TRIGGER-HAPPY NATURE OF KIM IL-SUNG BUT THE INTERNAL DISUNITY IN OUR SOCIETY THAT WE HAVE TO TRULY DREAD IN FACE OF THIS EXTERNAL THREAT".

7. PRESS APRIL 21 REPORTED REMARKS BY UNIFICATION MINISTER SIN TO-SONG, REPORTEDLY GIVING CONCLUSIONS OF APRIL 18 MEETING OF ROK NORTH KOREAN EXPERTS ANALYZING RECENT MOVES BY PYONGYANG. SIN TOLD PRESS THAT VISIT BY KIM TO PEKING AGAINST BACKGROUND OF INDOCHINA DEVELOPMENTS WAS INDICATION THAT NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGY AGAINST SOUTH "HAS NOW BEEN SETTLED AS A POLICY OF UNIFICATION BY MILITARY FORCE." SIN SAID THAT THE EXPERTS

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HAD CONCLUDED THAT NORTH KOREA HAD FAILED IN ITS SIX YEAR ECONOMIC PLAN, FORCING IT TO ADOPT AGGRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE ROK. DECIDING AGAINST ALTERNATIVE OF OPENING ITS SYSTEM TO THE WORLD, SIN SAID, NORTH IS OPTING FOR MILITARY CONFRONTATION AGAINST SOUTH ON ONE HAND AND PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY ON THE OTHER, WITH THE LATTER COURSE AIMED AT ISOLATING SEOUL FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND CREATING INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION FAVORING THE WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM KOREA.

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